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Asian money markets entered the financial crisis in better shape than markets in other 
regions due to a substantial build-up of savings and liquidity in their banking systems, as 
well as a greater domestic focus in most of the region’s markets. However, despite the 
higher liquidity and lower levels of global integration, the effects of the crisis in Asia were 
severe and followed a similar path observed in international markets. The further 
development of money markets, particularly in less developed economies, will require 
policies and initiatives that add liquidity and depth to attract broader participation from 
both domestic and international investors—including regional cooperation, a robust 
regulatory architecture, and foreign competition to expedite the development of less 
developed money markets. Risk management and liquidity assumptions also need to be 
enhanced to establish buffers that will withstand more severe and prolonged external 
shocks and disruptions to external financing. 
 
 
Keywords: Money market, money market participants, components of money markets, 
financial crisis 
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1. Introduction   
 
Emerging Asian money markets remain largely underdeveloped compared with the 
mature markets of the United States (US) and Europe. Although this helped insulate the 
region from the most severe effects of the 2008/09 financial meltdown, critical lessons 
can be drawn on how to build efficiently integrated money markets that can withstand 
regulatory failures and structural flaws that continue to exist.
1  
 
To strengthen emerging Asian money markets, policies should be tuned to ensure that 
model assumptions are given adequate consideration. They should be designed to allow 
for exogenous and domestic shocks. They need to consider market liquidity and the 
secured funding that is the foundation of risk management. They should also consider 
what kind of temporary guarantees on bank liabilities can boost money market trade, 
advance governance and risk management models, strengthen financial market 
infrastructure, and complement regulatory supervision. 
 
This paper aims to describe how to do this. Section II outlines the current state of money 
markets in emerging East Asia. Section III gives a rundown of recent money market 
developments—why most of the region’s banks were less affected than their US or 
European counterparts. Section IV discusses the medium-to long-term challenges for 
money market participants, including how they can significantly shape future money 
market development in the region. Section V argues that government stimulus has 
created an unprecedented need for debt financing via government bond issuances. 
Section VI describes money market strengths and weaknesses within the region. 
Section VII explains that, despite the diversity among the regions money markets, there 
is a common architecture that can enhance individual market development. And section 
VIII offers some concluding remarks on policy options for emerging Asian money 
markets to emerge stronger out of the global financial turmoil. 
 
2. Inside  Money  Markets 
 
Liquid money markets are critical to financial stability as they provide market participants 
with a significant portion of their required funding. Money markets are integral to the 
financial infrastructure of industrial countries and are among the largest financial markets 
in the world. These markets serve as channels for the execution and transmission of 
monetary policy, and as trading venues for the shortest-term instruments that anchor the 
entire term structure of interest rates. Money markets also play an important role in the 
credit evaluation process and in large-value payments systems where trades are settled. 
The region’s markets range from the international money centers of Singapore and Hong 
Kong, China—where local currencies trade alongside foreign currencies in deep and 
liquid markets—to emerging regional markets that are more domestically focused and at 
different stages of deregulation and development. 
 
                                                 
1  While information has been sourced from a variety of industry participants, official statistics, and 
referenced publications, the topic here is viewed through a broad prism of issues raised by the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS). BIS. “Capital Flows and Emerging Market Economies.” Committee 
on the Global Financial System (CGFS) Papers No. 33 (January 2009).  
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Financial centers that have deep and liquid markets tend to be those with more 
developed financial systems that can accommodate the underlying needs of the real 
economy. Instead of banking systems catering mainly to trade-based commerce, 
financial markets have altered their focus and gravitated towards domestic investment 
flows, funds management, international capital flows, and risk mitigation. This change 
reflects the globalized nature of financial markets and the internationalization of financial 
opportunities and customer bases. The rapid growth of Islamic finance in response to 
the demand for financial products as measured by shari’a-compliant assets is a more 
recent example of regional demand fostering market developments. 
Money markets are also central to capital allocation, the efficient distribution of liquidity 
among financial institutions, and the hedging of short-term risks. Modern day money 
markets can be defined as markets for deposits and short-term debt securities—such as 
bankers’ acceptances; commercial paper; repurchase agreements (repos); negotiable 
certificates of deposit; and Treasury bills with a maturity of 1 year or less, and often 30 
days or less. Money market securities are generally considered safe investments that 
return a relatively low interest rate for temporary cash storage or short-term tenure. Bid–
ask spreads are also relatively narrow due to the large size and high liquidity of the 
market. Despite their shorter-dated focus, it is important to note that money markets are 
a vital component of the larger financial system and cannot be seen in isolation from 
longer-dated debt markets. 
 
In addition to providing the clearing function for liquidity and currency exposure, money 
markets are the primary transmission mechanism for changes in central bank monetary 
policy aimed at the real economy. They act as an aggregator of liquidity and facilitator of 
spot- and short-dated exchanges. Policy changes are transmitted through interest rate 
movements, the issuance of government debt securities, repos, exchange rate 
intervention, the sterilization of foreign exchange (FX) intervention, and other open 
market activities that central banks use to change policy or smooth volatility.  
 
Developed money markets also help facilitate modern financial systems by allocating 
resources to end users quickly and efficiently—whether they are borrowers and issuers, 
or lenders and investors. A properly functioning market has deep liquidity and a relatively 
free operating environment, allowing it to allocate resources more efficiently than thinner, 
more regulated markets that carry distortions. Money markets allocate financial 
resources and generate an efficient frontier for capital distribution in which a demand 
and supply equilibrium brings optimum returns for each level of risk across a broad 
range of maturities and instruments. Accomplishing this requires market depth and 
liquidity, multiple participants, free information flows, and supportive regulatory and legal 
frameworks. Most short-dated money markets provide good examples of why depth and 
liquidity are important in re-channeling excess liquidity efficiently throughout the system.  
 
While the development of individual modern money markets reflect the underlying 
economy it services, they generally consist of a common set of components including (i) 
the interbank market, (ii) the securities market, (iii) repurchase agreement (repo) and 
swap markets, (iv) derivatives, and (v) asset-backed traded securities. 
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2.1 Interbank  Trading 
 
The market for interbank trading is the largest and most visible component of money 
markets. It is also an extremely efficient tool for managing liquidity and transmitting 
policy adjustments. Changes in price are transmitted instantly via banks dealing with 
each other in a less credit-constricted environment compared to dealings with the 
nonbank and commercial sectors. At the onset of the current crisis, the interbank market 
reacted by limiting dealing lines with other banks to reduce exposure to institutions 
whose creditworthiness was suddenly in doubt. One interesting aspect of the crisis was 
that credit concerns surrounded not only price, but also volume, as credit and dealing 
lines were reduced or withdrawn. This affected access to United States (US) dollars and 
other currency funding by banks that had relied on short-dated foreign exchange (FX) 
swaps and uncommitted money market loans to generate funding to support longer-term 
assets, which were now less liquid and of a longer duration than the underlying funding. 
The reduced credit and dealing capacity put additional strain on a market already 
suffering from dollar illiquidity as short-term loans and swaps needed to be rolled over to 
generate the required longer-dated funding.  
 
Since the most immediate crisis effect came via foreign currency markets, domestic 
currency markets were less impacted. The large liquidity pool was swelled by additional 
funds diverted to the relative safety of short-term deposits and by central bank open 
market operations designed to inject further liquidity into the system. The interbank 
market—being the point of price discovery—reacted quickly to the stress with overnight 
index swap (OIS) spreads blowing out dramatically for both the US dollar and regional 
currencies. In the Eurodollar market, the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)–OIS 
spread, having traditionally traded around 10 basis points, moved to an all-time high of 
364 basis points in October 2008, before dropping back to around 45 basis points by 
June 2009. 
 
2.2  Short-Term Securities: Certificates of Deposit, Commercial Paper, 
Treasury Bills, Promissory Notes, and Bills of Exchange 
 
Regional short-term securities markets, while being normally dominated by treasury bills, 
also incorporate a range of bank certificates of deposit (CDs) and commercial paper 
(Figure 1). These securities are held by money markets as tradable assets and a 
liquidity buffer, and for access to central bank funding through open market operations. 
The commercial paper markets have been growing in importance as banks sought 
alternatives to vanilla lending, which uses up both balance sheet capacity and capital. 
Also, from the issuer’s perspective, the commercial paper market offers the advantage of 
more competitive pricing as the bank-to-borrower “one-on-one” status is replaced with a 
broader relationship with the marketplace—as multiple market participants trade or 
warehouse an issuer’s paper. With the onset of the global financial crisis, money 
markets re-priced risk amid a liquidity shortage that led to a two-tier reaction. On one 
hand, risk aversion—and the need to hold highly liquid assets—had the effect of 
increasing demand for treasury bills while simultaneously reducing demand and liquidity 
for non-government paper. This was particularly true for commercial paper, which 
caused spreads to widen significantly. The risk aversion seen in cash money markets 
spread through securities markets, which limited the liquidity of commercial debt. This  
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situation was magnified in longer-dated international capital markets in which even 
highly-rated issuers could not raise funds and, in many cases, had to ultimately rely on a 
government guarantee in order to get an issue placed with investors. 
 
Figure 1: Outstanding Short-Term Debt Securities
1 
































































































































































Note:  VIE only has data for 2009Q1 
private ST debt securities, which is 
also very nil at 0.1%
 
1 Debt securities with remaining maturity up to one year, including those issued in domestic and 
international markets. Private sector debt covers securities issued by financial institutions and the 
corporate sector. Domestic securities for 2008 are as of September 2008.  
2 Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 GDP data for India is a World Economic Outlook estimate, for the Republic of 
Korea the estimate is taken from published FY budget ratios.  
Source:  
OREI staff calculations based on data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS); CEIC; World 




In the lead up to the crisis, the Republic of Korea (Korea) had approximately 37% of its 
gross domestic product (GDP) equivalent issued in short-dated securities, with the 
majority being private sector paper and showing a maturity profile at the basis of the 
problems that followed the worst of the liquidity squeeze when USD-denominated paper 
matured amid the meltdown. Singapore and Hong Kong, China also entered the period 
with relatively high private issuance as a percentage of total issuance, reflecting their 
position as international money centers. Malaysia’s high private issuance was, on the 
other hand, primarily domestically based and denominated in local currency (LCY). A 
high ratio of government issuances over private paper could be seen in the People’s 
Republic of China, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, which reflects the relative 
underdevelopment of their respective commercial paper markets and the dominance of 
government securities. 
 
With the twin effects of lower GDP growth and government fiscal stimulus, the expected 
impact of these two events will likely show (i) a marked increase in government issuance The Financial Crisis and Money Markets in Emerging Asia  |      6 
 
 
relative to both GDP and private securities, and (ii) an absolute contraction in both 
onshore and offshore issuances by the private sector as markets contract. 
 
2.3  Repo and Foreign Exchange Swap Markets   
 
While interbank cash markets are largely uncollateralized, repo and FX swap markets 
are collateralized. A repo transaction involves an underlying instrument as the saleable 
security. An FX swap is effectively collateralized by the second currency leg of the 
transaction. The repo
2 market’s role expanded considerably as the current financial crisis 
unfolded, with central bank operations in the open market allowing a wider group of 
securities as acceptable for repurchase agreements. This followed moves by the US 
Federal Reserve in which it accepted a wider range of securities for open market 
transactions that would previously have rated below the acceptable credit standing for 
such transactions.  
 
The repo market is often the primary means for central banks to inject liquidity into 
financial systems by adding flexibility to the marketplace in times of crisis. The 
development of interbank FX swap markets in emerging Asia has been limited in some 
economies by capital controls and restrictions on non-residents. In other cases, 
however, central banks have used swaps as a means of sterilizing market intervention in 
FX spot markets or injecting additional liquidity. In the more developed markets of 
Singapore and Hong Kong, China, the swap markets for foreign currencies are both 
broad based and liquid. Arbitrage between money markets and FX swap markets 
ensures that markets are aligned. The use of swap and repo markets to inject liquidity 
greatly helped local markets cope with the stress caused by the credit freeze. 
 
                                                 
2  The Fed for example uses repurchase agreements, also called "RPs" or "repos", to make collateralized 
loans to primary dealers. In a reverse repo or “RRP”, the Fed borrows money from primary dealers. 
The typical term of these operations is overnight, but the Fed can conduct these operations with terms 
out to 65 business days. The Fed uses these two types of transactions to offset temporary swings in 
bank reserves; a repo temporarily adds reserve balances to the banking system, while reverse repos 
temporarily drains balances from the system. (source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York)  
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Figure 2: Changes in REER
1 of Asian Currencies (%) 










USD JPY EUR CNY HKD IDR KRW MYR PHP SGD NTD THB
Jan 08–Sep 08 Sep 08–Mar 09 Mar 09–May 09
 
Notes: 
1 REER = Real effective exchange rate. 
USD= US dollar; JPY= Japanese yen; EUR= euro; CNY= People’s Republic of China (PRC) yuan; 
HKD= Hong Kong dollar; IDR= Indonesian rupiah; KRW= Korean won; MYR= Malaysian ringgit; 
PHP= Philippine peso; SGD= Singapore dollar; NTD= New Taiwan dollar; THB= Thai baht. 
Source: OREI staff calculations based on data from the Bank for International Settlements. 
 
 
The most substantial swap activity was noted in Hong Kong, China and—to a lesser 
degree— Singapore, while being virtually non-existent in other markets (Table 1). As 
Table 1 suggests, forward market activity is generally not well-developed. The standout 
amount of forward activity in Korea in 2007 largely reflected export sales. In addition, 
spot transactions reflect the activities of financial centers such as Singapore and Hong 
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Table 1: Transactions of Asian Currencies  
(Daily Averages, US$ Hundred Million) 









2008  April 2007  April 2008
China, People's  
 Republic of  0.0 0.3 3.4 4.8 0.1 0.0 
Hong Kong, China  31.8  36.7 3.3 1.2  12.9  10.9 
India 0.0  0.1  4.5 2.6  0.8  0.1 
Indonesia 0.1  0.1  0.6 1.3  0.1  0.0 
Korea, Republic of  0.5 4.2  13.1 4.8  1.8  2.6 
Malaysia 0.0  0.4  1.7 2.9  0.6  0.0 
Philippines 0.0  0.1 0.9 1.2  0.1  0.0 
Singapore 4.6  13.4  1.3 1.2  5.5  5.2 
Thailand 0.8  2.9  0.3 0.1  0.6  0.6 
Viet Nam  …  …  …  …  …  … 
 
… = no available data.           
Source: Results of Turnover Survey of Tokyo FX Market, Tokyo Foreign  Exchange  Market  Committee.                  
26 July 2007 and 22 July 2008 reports. 
 
 
2.4 Derivatives  Markets 
 
Outside Singapore and Hong Kong, China, which both have international derivative 
markets, the main domestic-focused derivative markets are in India, Korea, and 
Malaysia. Exchange-traded and over-the-counter (OTC) derivative markets elsewhere in 
the region are relatively small and undeveloped, although interest rate swaps (IRS) are 
present in Viet Nam. Meanwhile, forward rate agreements, IRS, futures, and options are 
not present in many emerging Asian markets. However, the importance of these 
instruments in offsetting exposure to market risk needs to be dealt with as risk 
management systems develop that require offsetting derivative contracts to mitigate risk 
exposure. OTC options, as opposed to exchange-traded instruments, represent the main 
activity in the region for LCY derivatives. Exchange-traded interest rate futures are 
traded in Hong Kong, China; Malaysia; and Singapore; but only Malaysia has exchange-
traded interest rates exceeding those traded through OTC markets and forward rate 
agreements.
3 
                                                 
3  On August 11, the Treasury Department released the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 
2009 (“OCDMA”), its legislative proposal to regulate the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives industry. 
The proposed legislation provides an approach to comprehensively regulating OTC derivative 
transactions and the entities that enter into OTC derivatives transactions. Through its proposal, the 
Treasury Department is recommending the repeal of many provisions of the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act (“CFMA”), which was adopted in 2000. (Source: Harvard Law School Forum on 
Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, 1 September 2009).  
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2.5  Asset-backed Commercial Paper Markets 
 
Securitized debt instruments underpinned the US subprime mortgage crisis, where loans 
were re-engineered into highly-rated debt securities and then on-sold to investors 
through what came to be known as the originate-to-distribute model. Investors primarily 
relied on credit ratings assigned by ratings agencies. However, confidence eroded along 
with investor interest, forcing financial institutions to warehouse securities meant for 
distribution. This added to the drain on market liquidity as these institutions scrambled to 
fund the securities. More liquidity stress came just as concerns spread to other types of 
structured debt, which in turn further exacerbated the liquidity problem and led to a 
vicious cycle. In addition to liquidity strains, a loss of confidence led to ratings 
downgrades for many forms of structured debt and asset-backed commercial paper 
(ABCP), leaving them as unacceptable securities for collateralized money market 
transactions. This reinforced the downward spiral in value; fed the loop of liquidity strain, 
asset depreciation, and distressed sales or mark-to-market revaluations; and further 
eroded liquidity and confidence.  
 
However, emerging Asia’s domestic money markets were largely insulated from the 
direct fallout of structured- and asset-backed securities. The presence of undeveloped 
markets in securitized debt in regional currencies was one reason, while another was the 
twin focus on prime, or government, debt and the shorter-term horizon of money market 
investors.  
 
Malaysia and Hong Kong, China have secondary mortgage markets. While the 
underlying loans supporting the market in no way resembled their US counterparts in 
either creditworthiness or volume, they were affected by events in the US and the 
subsequent global meltdown. At the same time, other countries such as Thailand are 
examining ways of utilizing ABCP to provide deeper liquidity as well as more competitive 
pricing. This approach holds many opportunities for emerging Asian markets to use the 
benefits of securitization to add liquidity and mobilize funding for numerous types of 
ABCP. The current crisis should, however, not detract from the recognized importance of 
this market in freeing up balance sheets and allowing previous illiquid assets to be 
securitized and traded. A properly constructed market with creditworthy securities 
underpinning traded paper will offer many opportunities for enhanced loan origination 
and investment options for fund managers and investors, both locally and globally. 
 
 
3.  Recent Money Market Developments—Financial System 
Liquidity 
 
Despite some improvement, the relative underdevelopment of money markets in 
emerging Asia helped insulate the region from the core financial turmoil that rapidly 
spread beyond the United States (US) subprime market. The liquidity crisis—coming on 
top of solvency concerns for many financial institutions—led to a severe distortion in the 
global Eurodollar market. US dollar liquidity dried up and a credit crunch effectively 
closed most international debt markets for all but sovereign guaranteed issuers. This led 
to an additional credit-driven contraction in the real economy as the downturn reduced The Financial Crisis and Money Markets in Emerging Asia  |      10 
 
 
consumption, production, investment, and expenditures. In an export-driven region such 
as emerging Asia, the crisis spillover came mainly via the external account as exports 
and investment flows collapsed alongside domestic demand.  
 
Regionally, most banks were less affected than their North American and European 
counterparts. This reduced impact is in part due to the high savings of the household 
sector and large accumulated foreign reserves. While debt transmits a loss of 
confidence quickly and efficiently, high household and national savings provided a 
degree of financial insulation. To some extent, many of the less-developed Asian money 
markets were initially less impacted by dollar illiquidity precisely because of the domestic 
nature of their markets and high savings ratios. However, the money markets of 
Singapore and Hong Kong, China—as well as the Republic of Korea (Korea)—were 
immediately impacted as US dollars were suddenly withdrawn, leaving acute shortages 
for Eurodollar funding.  
 
Notwithstanding the relatively better position of the region’s markets, the crisis effects in 
emerging East Asian markets were significant and followed a similar path to that 
observed in international markets. The initial impact was characterized by a seizing-up of 
credit and settlement lines within the interbank market as banks withdrew limits amid 
uncertainty over the extent of the crisis and the financial strength of their peers. With the 
banking system dominated by international banks operating across most markets, the 
impact was instantaneous and felt by branches and subsidiaries operating in all markets, 
and not just those at the epicenter of the meltdown. In essence, head office decisions 
were made with global implications for money markets, including emerging Asian 
markets. Local banks, in turn, reduced or cut limits for global banks in response to this 
uncertainty, which exacerbated US dollar illiquidity. 
 
Credit lines and uncommitted facilities were withdrawn from other market users, 
including the corporate sector, as banks hoarded liquidity and reassessed exposures. 
International debt markets were also impacted as underwriters and investors reacted to 
the meltdown. Planned issues were cancelled and the corporate sector, which had 
grown accustomed to easy credit, had to look for alternative sources of finance. This 
would have an enormous impact on a number of large multinational companies around 
the globe as their funding capability from both debt and equity markets dried up 
simultaneously. The withdrawal of credit ultimately led to the collapse or restructuring of 
many large companies, and was transmitted back to the markets in the form of falling 
values for collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and sharply rising premiums for credit 
default swaps (CDS), which had both been used extensively in structured debt facilities 
that had been securitized and traded back into the markets. 
 
The household sector responded in a similar way by withdrawing funds from both equity 
and debt markets. The investment freeze that followed saw equity markets fall as both 
institutional and retail funds withdrew, while bank deposits rose as a safe haven for 
liquidity. This safe haven status given to bank deposits was further enhanced in some 
instances with deposit guarantees. As confidence collapsed, a flight to quality ensued in 
the form of a massive inflow of international funds into US Treasuries, causing both the 
US dollar to rise and bond yields to fall to record levels as funds ignored diminishing 
returns. Similar effects were felt across the globe particularly in Japan where the  
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unwinding of the Yen carry trade by international hedge funds and speculators, 
combined with liquidation of the household sector’s higher yielding foreign investments, 
saw funds repatriated at a rapid rate forcing the yen higher and crystallizing losses on 
the foreign investments”  
 
With the global financial meltdown putting severe stress on asset values, the balance 
sheets of many banks came under pressure as writedowns decimated their capital 
bases. This ultimately led to partial and, in some cases, full effective nationalization of 
banks as well as a refocusing of strategy away from foreign markets back to respective 
domestic operational bases. With this pullback still unfolding, the structure of some 
regional money markets is likely to change with regard to the composition of large 
international banks and the downsizing of their emerging market risk appetites. 
 
In a region heavily dependent on international trade, the impact of the crisis on trade 
finance was significant. The financial crisis caused a severe contraction in international 
trade in the period following the Lehman Brothers collapse. The fall in trade exceeded 
what would normally be expected by a drop in demand alone. Studies suggest that the 
fall also reflected a disruption to financial intermediation in trade finance as the price of 
finance rose and its availability fell.
4 The price of trade finance increased sharply for 
letters of credit and short- to medium-term lending facilities in which the goods traded 
serve as collateral. While the increased cost of funds to the banking sector was largely 
attributable to higher rates, higher internal and expected regulatory capital requirements 
also may have affected pricing. Counterparty risk became another inhibiting factor 
alongside similar concerns in the interbank market as banks reviewed their criteria for 
dealing with other banks.  
 
As the global economic contraction has reduced trade, an effective response may be 
increased emphasis on intra-regional trade through trade financing supported by 
governments and multilateral organizations. With the region heavily dependent on trade 
and a large proportion of that trade involving small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), the free availability of trade finance will be crucial to economic recovery. SMEs, 
which are more heavily impacted by credit constraints than their larger counterparts, 
represent the sector that would benefit most from coordinated regional assistance. 
 
Box 1:   Fed to the Rescue: Initial Reactions  
The United States (US) Federal Reserve’s (Fed) early response to the financial crisis 
showed the importance of money markets as the primary channel providing liquidity to the 
real economy. One of the hallmarks of money market funds is their ability to maintain stable 
net asset values—typically at USD1 per share.
5  As the primary supplier of credit and short-
term debt, any concerns regarding money market liquidity will quickly translate into a 
reduction in credit provision across the broader spectrum.  
The causes of the financial crisis have been attributed to many factors. But together they 
resulted in panicked markets, extreme equity market volatility, plunging prices across most 
                                                 
4  International Monetary Fund (IMF). March 2009. Finance and Development. 
5  Speech by U.S. Securities and Exchange Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar. Strengthening the Money 
Market Framework with Investors in Mind. 24 June 2009. The Financial Crisis and Money Markets in Emerging Asia  |      12 
 
 
other asset classes, and essentially froze credit and securitization markets. Money markets 
were suddenly and deeply hit by a rapid succession of events. Just prior to 15 September 
2008, money market assets in the US totaled USD3.5 trillion.
6  That week saw the sale of 
Merrill Lynch to Bank of America, Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, and the Fed bailout of 
American International Group, Inc. (AIG).
7  Meanwhile, Bearn Stearns had already filed for 
bankruptcy in March 2008. 
The nature and scope of the crisis required several concerted and parallel policy 
responses—one of which was to provide central bank liquidity to ensure money markets 
could keep functioning. But there were "unintended consequences"
8 of what otherwise 
seemed sensible policy implementation. After the financial rug was pulled out from under 
mortgage-backed securities, the loss of confidence quickly spread to other asset-backed 
securities. Money market liquidity became tight as issuers were forced to warehouse 
increasing amounts of loans that had previously been earmarked for securitization and sale. 
Thus, money market participants were forced to retain increasing amounts of securities on 
their balance sheets as most asset-backed commercial paper markets grew increasingly 
impaired. 
This was critically important to money markets as vast sums were falling due each day, in 
effect causing almost instant contagion when liquidity faltered. The spread between interest 
rates on commercial paper and Treasury bills spiked after the failure of Lehman Brothers. 
Adding to the pressure was a money market fund that faced defaults on its Lehman 
Brothers’ commercial paper investments—losses of such magnitude that the fund closed 
and paid its investors below the standard USD1 per share par value, thus “breaking the 
buck”.  Institutional investors then began redeeming shares of money market funds invested 
in commercial paper. To meet the withdrawals, the funds had to sell their paper holdings 
into a thin market. This caused commercial paper rate spreads to widen to extreme levels.  
To prevent a breakdown of the commercial paper market, initial policies aimed to support 
liquidity in money market mutual funds. The Fed encouraged banks to use its discount 
window to finance loans to money market funds that were facing redemptions, while the US 
Treasury Department extended deposit insurance to the funds to calm investor concern that 
other funds would "break the buck". But risk aversion surged following the Lehman 
Brothers’ collapse and liquidity premiums rose, leading to a sharp widening of the spread 
between commercial paper and Treasury bill interest rates.  
It became almost impossible for even highly rated companies to continue issuing new 
commercial paper. The result was a sharp fall in the amount of commercial paper 
outstanding. As a next policy step, the Fed allowed money market mutual funds to borrow 
collateralized discount loans from a new money market investor funding facility. This helped 
prevent a flood of money market fund redemptions that risked setting off a disorderly sale of 
commercial paper in an already unstable market. 
Investors were, however, still uncertain whether companies would be able to issue new 
paper to repay maturing debt, especially given the risk aversion of other investors. Once 
again to calm the market, the Fed announced it would fund purchases of top-rated 
commercial paper via a new facility capitalized by the Treasury—the commercial paper 
funding facility.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
6  George Hagerman, Cachematrix Holdings, LLC. Money Market Funds: The Impact of the Financial 
Crisis. 29 June, 2009. 
7 Ibid. 
8  Barry Eichengreen. Anatomy of the Financial Crisis. 23 September 2008.  
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Since October 2008, commercial paper lending has revived, and spreads between 
commercial paper and Treasury bills with comparable maturities have narrowed. Steps to 
bolster liquidity in related markets have also contributed to the improved functioning of the 
commercial paper market.  
Given the events of the of the last year and the continuing economic and financial market 
turmoil, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)—responsible for regulating 
money market funds—has proposed regulatory changes aimed at increasing the resilience 
of money market funds to market disruptions.  
The broad-based amendments are designed to:  
•  improve portfolio credit quality, 
•  limit portfolio weighted average maturity, 
•  enhance portfolio liquidity, 
•  employ stress tests, and 
•  provide enhanced disclosure. 
 
3.1  Indicators of Market Stress and Collapse of Confidence 
 
While local currency (LCY) money books dominated the less developed markets, US 
dollar shortages impacted the more developed markets as the supply of dollars 
evaporated. The extent and severity of this market stress can be gauged from the 
LIBOR–OIS spread (London Interbank Offered Rate–overnight indexed swaps), which is 
widely regarded as a leading indicator. During the last quarter of 2008, the wide LIBOR–
OIS spread reflected a near total collapse in confidence in the interbank market. 
However, more recent movements in 2009 have seen an easing in conditions from the 
worst of the crisis. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the spread widened to 
364 basis points from its pre-crisis range of around 10 bps. The widening resulted from 
uncertainty and elevated concerns about credit risks as banks reduced lending to each 
other, with LIBOR rising sharply in response to these concerns. The spread has 
contracted significantly over the course of 2009 as confidence gradually returned to 
interbank lending as measured by LIBOR. By the end of June, the LIBOR–OIS spread 
had narrowed back to around 45 basis points, which is its lowest level since February 
2008. The 3-month LIBOR rate fell steadily from 4.82% in October 2008 to 1.0% in April 
2009, and reached 0.595% at the end of June. In part, this fall measured receding 
market concerns resulting from the US Federal Reserve’s stress testing of US banks, 
which revealed no major shocks and mapped out an achievable path to bank 
recapitalization. 
 
With the LIBOR representing a benchmark rate for USD360 trillion of financial products, 
the steady fall in this benchmark has been welcomed by the market as conditions have 
eased and confidence returned. While the LIBOR–OIS spread has been recognized as a 
primary indicator of market stress, movements in the spread can also reflect other 
factors such as decreased liquidity or expected future rate increases. In addition to 
positioning for or against expected rate moves in either leg of the spread, OIS can be 
used to change the interest rate or liquidity profile without an underlying physical 
transaction and with minimal credit usage, except for counterparty risk on the swap. An The Financial Crisis and Money Markets in Emerging Asia  |      14 
 
 
expected rate movement would prompt the interest rate profile of a money market book 
to be altered. In the case of an expected rate increase, liabilities would be lengthened; 
or, alternatively, the maturity of assets would be lengthened in the expectation of a rate 
fall. OIS swaps can provide an alternative to a change in the underlying physical book’s 
profile without the maturity profile changing. The swap itself does not involve an 
exchange of principal and is, therefore, settled on a net basis. 
In the case of an expected fall in a policy rate, a money market book could enter a swap 
transaction to receive the longer-dated coupon (LIBOR) and pay the average of the 
overnight rate for the duration of the swap, effectively generating a rate profile identical 
to that of generating a longer-dated asset (loan) and funding it at the cheaper overnight 
rate (deposit). If the expected rate fall were to occur during the life of the swap, the payer 
of the overnight rate would pick up this benefit in terms of a "cheaper" deposit rate. In 
the above examples, the interest rate profile has been altered but the underlying 
physical profile has not changed since there are no additional assets or liabilities.  
OIS swaps can also be used to alter a liquidity profile without the corresponding interest 
rate penalty. In the event that overnight liabilities are at maximum internal tolerances for 
liquidity purposes, the book can raise term funds from the market and repay overnight 
deposits to improve their liquidity position. To negate the higher cost of the term funding, 
the bank would enter a swap in order to receive the longer coupon, which is basically 
equivalent to the expense it was paying on the longer-dated deposit, and pay away the 
overnight rate. By combining the two transactions, the liquidity position is altered by the 
addition of increased term deposits, while the interest rate profile, however, remains 
unchanged.  
LIBOR averages, which have been interpreted as an additional indicator of individual 
banks willingness to lend, suggest that the fall in the LIBOR masks a growing gap 
between the range of rates that the biggest banks charge each other, i.e. the gap 
between the highest and lowest rates banks claim they charge each other when 
compiling LIBOR averages for each maturity. As of April 2009, the average LIBOR gap 
between the highest and lowest rates quoted by the 16 contributing banks averaged 7.5 
basis points—up from 4.9 basis points in April 2009 and 1.5 basis points prior to the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The wider dispersion of quotes is one 
reflection of individual banks actual willingness and ability to lend. However, a fall in the 
LIBOR can also be influenced by increased deposits, reducing demand for interbank 
funding and reflecting better liquidity conditions rather than just an increased willingness 
on the part of banks to lend to one another. 
In Asia, individual market stress varied substantially given the diverse levels of market 
integration and development, differences in banking infrastructure, and a range of 
domestic factors—including a structural funding flaw in the case of Korea. The financial 
instruments utilized in each market have, however, largely been the same, albeit with 
differing levels of importance and at different levels of sophistication. While authorities 
lowered interest rates and injected liquidity in response to the financial crisis and strains 
on US dollar liquidity, the range of outcomes and immediate effects were quite diverse.
9 
Year-on-year growth in the stock of treasury bills and central bank bills, for example, 
rose in 1Q2009 in several of the regions’ markets as central banks and monetary 
                                                 
9  ADB. 2009. Asia Bond Monitor Summer Issue. Manila.  
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authorities aggressively participated in the issuance of bills. The value of LCY treasury 
bills reached USD138.3 billion (up 9.3% q-o-q on an LCY basis), while central bank bills 
were recorded at about USD449.6 billion (up 5.0% q-o-q on an LCY basis) at the end of 
1Q2009. The stock of treasury bonds and central bank bonds also declined modestly in 
1Q2009, resulting in a slight rise of the bills-to-bonds ratios in most markets in 1Q2009 
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3.2  The Global Financial Crisis and some Country Specific 
Ramifications for Individual Money Markets  
 
The wide diversity in domestic financial market development has led to a diverse range 
of crisis impacts across the region. Nonetheless, money markets in the region 
experienced some degree of dislocation. Those markets with a low level of global 
integration were relatively less affected than those with a higher degree.  
 
Money markets in the People's Republic of China (PRC) were liberalized at a slower 
pace than markets in many other economies in the region. Reforms in the PRC were 
implemented under a “controlled financial innovation” model and within a regulatory 
framework implemented by the Peoples Bank of China (PBOC). With recent banking 
system reforms, state-owned banks have been recapitalized, foreign bank access has 
increased, and rules governing securities trading and ownership have been changed. 
Due to a greater domestic focus, PRC money markets have been less affected by the 
crisis than their more integrated counterparts such as Hong Kong, China. For example, 
the basis swap curves for the PRC; Hong Kong, China; and Singapore measure the 3-
month interbank offer rate less the overnight index swap (OIS) rate and show the 
immediate market impact of the Lehman Brothers collapse in 2008 (Figure 3a). These 
spreads are regarded as a measure of market stress and show elevated and rising 
stress levels in both Hong Kong and Singapore dollars. However, they also show sharply 
falling spreads in the PRC, with its less integrated and more controlled market for official 
rates. 
 
Figure 3a: Basis Swap Spreads
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1  3-month interbank offer rate minus 3-month overnight index swap rate. 
Source: OREI staff calculations based on Bloomberg data. 
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India’s money markets and financial system have been undergoing a period of 
liberalization since the 1990s, with private banking growing strongly at the expense of 
the state-owned and -controlled commercial banks. Money markets have developed a 
wide range of securities that traded in relatively large, liquid markets. With the onset of 
the global crisis, the established trend toward private commercial banks and market 
innovation reversed under the wholesale risk retreat. Risk aversion and worries over 
credit stress flowed through to the Indian TED spread—the difference between the 3-
month Mumbai interbank offer rate and the yield on 3-month treasury bills—which rose 
rapidly and remained relatively elevated despite strong intervention by the central bank 
to lower rates and inject liquidity. Before easing, the Indian basis spread rose 
dramatically from a level of around 100 basis points in June 2008 to a high of around 
550 basis points by October 2008 (Figure 3b). The stress in the Indian market was 
exacerbated by the extreme risk aversion of investors and institutions as the impact of 
the crisis unfolded. This coincided with the transfer of activity back to the government-
owned banking sector. 
Figure 3b: Basis Swap Spreads
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1  Three-month interbank offer rate minus three-month overnight index swap rate. 
Source: OREI staff calculations based on Bloomberg data. 
 
Indonesia's market comprises a large number of smaller banks and was forced to 
maintain a relatively high interest rate structure by Bank Indonesia, which was 
concerned with currency depreciation and capital flight. In addition, a relatively high and 
growing loan-to-deposit ratio in the banking system meant that the impact on liquidity 
was quite severe, notwithstanding central bank efforts to inject liquidity through the repo 
window as well as arrange currency swaps with Japan and the Republic of Korea 
(Korea), and most recently, the PRC. 
 
Korea was severely hit by a US dollar withdrawal since its money markets were heavy 
users of the shorter-dated FX swaps and cross currency swaps that funded strong 
domestic credit growth. One major cause of the outflow and transmission of US dollar  
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shortages to the domestic market was an arbitrage opportunity that allowed (mainly) 
foreign banks and international investors—including hedge funds—to swap short-dated 
US dollar loans into Korean won at levels substantially below domestic interest rates, 
and make substantial purchases of government paper and bank certificates of deposit 
(CDs). This arbitrage resulted from heavy forward sales of US dollars as major Korean 
exporters sought to lock in a forward rate, thereby providing an opportunity to generate 
won at effective interest rates well below those available in the domestic market.
10 This 
artificial distortion was felt as yields on short-dated paper fell with arbitrage purchases 
made prior to the crisis. As the crisis unfolded and dollar liquidity dried up, the arbitrage 
window closed and reversed, which resulted in won securities being sold. Yields 
subsequently rose when securities were rapidly offloaded to repay the US dollar loans 
made amid the crisis despite official policy initiatives to lower interest rates. At the end of 
2008, Korea was the only listed country with a loan-to-deposit ratio greater than 1.0, 
reflecting excess credit growth over and above that funded by deposits (Figure 4). This 
is consistent with the scenario of much higher, private, short-term debt issuance to fund 
the gap. Hong Kong, China—with a loan-to-deposit ratio of around 0.50—shows the 
buildup of domestic liquidity as deposits exceeded loans and resulted in large securities 
holdings by the money market. While these figures reflect the period through late 2008, it 
could be expected that these ratios may have fallen further as deposit funds continued to 
flow to the banking system and loan activity was curtailed due to risk aversion.  
 
Malaysia’s banking and money markets emerged from the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis 
much stronger. With 90% of bank assets in local currency (LCY) rather than foreign-
denominated assets, Malaysian markets have been better insulated from the global 
meltdown despite Malaysia being an open economy with significant exposure to falling 
commodity prices. The money market has recently seen significant growth in both short-
dated money market deposits and retail bank deposits. This growth has occurred against 
a backdrop of rapidly falling interest rates—Bank Negara Malaysia eased its overnight 
interest rate from 3.5% in September 2008 to 2.0% in February 2009—and reductions in 
the statutory reserve requirement from 3.5% to 1.0%, effective 1 March 2009.  
 
The Philippines has a well-developed money market and an excess of international 
interbank placements over its borrowings. However, a number of factors—including 
foreign portfolio outflows, a high inflation rate, and a fiscal deficit—combined to limit a 
policy response to the financial crisis. A widening of the rediscount window and interest 
rate reductions were the tools used to keep liquidity moving throughout the system to 
support economic activity. 
 
Singapore and Hong Kong, China, with globally integrated markets and the presence of 
large foreign banks, both felt the immediate effects of the global crisis. The Monetary 
Authority of Singapore (MAS), for example, arranged currency swap lines with the US 
Federal Reserve to free US dollar liquidity locally. However, the domestic markets for 
both the Hong Kong and Singapore dollars were less affected than more internationally 
traded currencies. 
 
                                                 
10  McCauley and Zukunft. 2008. Asian Banks and the International Interbank Market. BIS Quarterly 
Review. June 2008. The Financial Crisis and Money Markets in Emerging Asia  |      20 
 
 























Covers loans to the private sector and non-financial institutions, and deposits (demand, 
time, savings, foreign currency, bond, and money market instruments) of banking 
institutions, deposit money banks, and other depository corporations of each country. 
1 Data for the Philippines as of May 2009; for People's Republic of China (PRC); 
Indonesia; Malaysia; and Thailand, as of Apr 2009; for Hong Kong, China; India; and 
Singapore as of Mar 2009; and for Republic of Korea and Viet Nam as of Feb 2009. 
 
Source: OREI staff calculations based on data from International Financial Statistics 
Online, International Monetary Fund; and CEIC for the Philippines. 
 
 
In the Singapore dollar market, a tightly regulated regime limited the fallout as the MAS 
acted in the open market to bring down domestic rates and provide liquidity. In the Hong 
Kong dollar market, massive liquidity had been built into the domestic currency, which 
limited the impact on the HKD-denominated balance sheets of local banks (due to very 
low loan-to-deposit ratios) and left banks with a large pool of liquid securities. 
Additionally, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) entered into a currency swap 
with PBOC for CNY200 billion to provide liquidity to mainland banks in Hong Kong, 
China, while simultaneously providing Hong Kong, China banks with liquidity in the PRC. 
Interbank claims in the region show the financial centers of Hong Kong, China and 
Singapore as having dramatically higher claims than their less integrated counterparts 
(Figure 5). This situation reflects liquidity in the system and the nature of the trend 
towards financial assets—the placement of excess funds with banks rather than with the 
corporate sector—as well as the safe haven status of both financial centers. In addition, 
it is likely that the relative size of the interbank claims in each market will have increased 
throughout 2009 as credit remains hoarded in the banking system and lending is 
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Figure 5: Interbank Claims
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Note:  CEIC-sourced data of PRC & MAL, as well as 
national-sourced data for PHI significantly different 
from what's shown in paper.  No data for VIE.  
Available data for India is only annual.  
 
                      PRC = People’s Republic of China.  
1.  Includes amounts due from, and balances with, banks of all types under the banking 
system of each country.  
2.  Data for all countries until May 2009, except for Republic of Korea which is until March 
2009. No 2009 data for India. 




In Thailand, short-dated interest rates were reduced sharply as monetary authorities 
sought to limit the impact of the crisis on the economy. A major concern with monetary 
authorities and the Bank of Thailand was the reduced transmission of policy changes 
with rate reductions reflected in wholesale money markets that were not passed through 
to retail and commercial end users (Figures 6a, 6b, 6c). A loan guarantee plan for 
lending to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) was launched to relieve 
quantitative constraints on the flow of credit. However, the widening risk premiums being 
levied by banks remain a blockage to the full flow of rate reductions. The inefficiency in 
the transmission mechanism for wholesale money market rate reductions is one reason 
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1  Overnight (o/n) interbank offer rate (IBOR); for the Republic of Korea used o/n call rate; and 




In Viet Nam, the crisis led to substantial falls in foreign portfolio investment and stock 
market valuations. This occurred in an environment of high inflation and a current 
account deficit of 14% of GDP. To mitigate the slowdown effects, the State Bank of Viet 
Nam issued credit directives to the banking sector requiring credit to be extended and 
loans to be restructured, while at the same time operating in the open market to provide 
money market liquidity. Despite far reaching intervention by the central bank during the 
crisis, the overall future is one of liberalization and progress toward market-driven 
financial system development 
 
 
4.  Development of Money Markets: Medium-to Long-Term 
Challenges for Participants 
 
4.1 Market  Participants 
 
Asian markets possess a more stable funding base—derived from retail and institutional 
depositors—than do G3 markets (Eurozone, Japan, US) that are more dependent on 
wholesale debt issuance. While remaining relatively unscathed from the subprime and 
structured product meltdown in the US, the region’s markets were hit indirectly by the 
crisis’ spillover effects. Yet, most of the region’s money markets remained in relatively 
good shape, with retail and institutional depositors viewing bank deposits as the 
preferred method of wealth preservation, thereby allowing the region’s banking systems 
to be flush with short-dated liquidity. The safe haven status of bank deposits has also 
been enhanced by deposit insurance and guarantees provided by governments to cover The Financial Crisis and Money Markets in Emerging Asia  |      24 
 
 
demand deposits in many cases. Additionally, with much of the region having maintained 
strong current account surpluses and large foreign reserves, many sovereigns compared 
favorably with developed economies that had high fiscal and current account deficits 
combined with low domestic savings ratios. 
 
The high savings ratio in the region and the rush to safe haven bank and money market 
deposits resulted in the buildup of liquidity in the money market, leaving banks with an 
excess of short-dated funds. This difference was particularly sharp when compared with 
many G3 financial institutions that relied heavily on wholesale capital markets for funding 
rather than a local depositor base. The size and dynamics of the depositor base and the 
relatively high savings ratio in the region helped shore up local markets against currency 
shortages. From the viewpoint of bank balance sheets and liquidity, this situation 
appeared favorable. However, it came about at the expense of the real economy, as 
credit flows to the private sector were stunted due to generally heightened risk aversion 
and a broadening credit crunch.  
 
While a changing market profile will cause each segment of the money market to adapt 
to new circumstances, the roles played by major participants can significantly shape 
future developments in the region’s money markets as they develop and mature over 
time.
 11 
4.1.1  Government and Central Banks  
 
The primary responsibility of central banks is the implementation of monetary policy. A 
central bank’s actions, policies, and regulatory framework will have a determining 
influence on the development and efficiency of the marketplace and in defining the 
direction and development of a country’s financial market. In addition to formulating 
monetary policy, central banks in many economies are also integral to financial 
regulation, reserves and liquidity management, interest rate and currency intervention, 
open market sterilization, and bond and note issuance. 
 
Further development of the region’s money markets and a broadening of the product 
suite will require authorities to increase supervision and methods of risk recognition. 
With the onset of the financial crisis, central banks acted swiftly to lessen the impact on 
their respective markets. A broad range of measures were taken to maintain market 
liquidity and encourage the flow of funds throughout financial systems. These measures 
included easing monetary policy to encourage lending and economic activity, arranging 
swap lines with other central banks to avoid foreign currency shortages, lending foreign 
currency directly to domestic markets, guaranteeing deposit insurance and bank lending, 
and injecting capital into some banks. Open market operations were also expanded with 
the opening and broadening of repo markets, in which a wider range of collateral was 
accepted to add liquidity to the system. Central bank actions were both timely and 
                                                 
11  Although there has been considerable progress since the mid 1990s in developing the region’s capital 
markets, the banking sector remains the dominant source of funding. Total domestic financing 
increased from about 25 billion USD in 1995 to 43 billion USD in 2008. During the same period, the 
share of the banking sector decreased from 58% to 45% while the bond market increased from 21% to 
33%. The equity market increased more modestly in size from 21 to 23%. (Source: ADB staff 
calculations)  
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effective in lessening the impact of the crisis and providing liquidity. Yet, further 
development of the region’s money markets and a broadening of the product suite will 
require authorities to increase supervision and methods of risk recognition. Central 
banks and/or market regulators will need to ensure that adequate reporting and 
monitoring of risk exposures exists within the financial system; and financial institutions 
have robust capital positions, balance sheet strength, and risk management systems. 
4.1.2  Banks and the Interbank Market 
 
The interbank market plays a key role as it has the platform and capability to import skill 
sets and product innovations into a developing marketplace. In most of the region’s 
markets, local banks dominate local LCY dealings through access to a retail customer 
deposit base. This provides a source of cheap funds compared with the funding 
platforms of many other participants. Foreign banks and new entrants without a local 
deposit base tend to be more reliant on wholesale and interbank swap markets to 
generate funding. In some instances, there may also be regulatory impediments to 
sourcing LCY deposits competitively. However, while local banks may have a 
competitive LCY advantage, the same is not necessarily the case in offshore markets. 
Whereas the region’s banks can rely on their deposit bases for LCY, often their relative 
size or credit rating will make them less competitive relative to the larger foreign banks in 
international debt issuance markets where longer-dated term funding can be sourced. 
Although these markets are—following the current financial crisis—temporarily closed to 
all but prime names or institutions with a sovereign guarantee, the relative advantage of 
larger global banks over the region’s banks in international capital markets remains an 
issue. With respect to the interbank market being the key funding platform, it has the 
capability to import skill sets and product innovations to a developing marketplace. 
Robust competition in the interbank market provides fertile ground for further 
improvement and product development that eventually seeps down to the underlying 
real economy in the form of increased efficiency in capital allocation and competitive 
pricing. 
4.1.3  The Corporate Sector 
 
The corporate sector can enhance development within a marketplace by changing the 
basis of banking relationships. The corporate sector uses money markets as lenders and 
borrowers of excess liquidity, as well as being counterparties for foreign exchange (FX), 
securities, and derivative transactions. The corporate sector is often represented by 
manufacturers or local subsidiaries due to a concentration of both light and heavy 
manufacturing throughout the region. Subsidiaries of multinational corporations often 
bring an existing global banking relationship to the region’s markets. While these existing 
relationships may be strong in the home market, their global bankers may have less 
capability with LCY transactions. As a result, multinational corporations often represent a 
potential customer base for local banks seeking profitable sales and spread retention 
dealings with corporate customers.  
 
Competing banks in money markets place a high value on corporate business and are 
generally prepared to accept narrow trading spreads when dealing with corporations. 
While this competitiveness drives efficiencies toward the corporate user, the money The Financial Crisis and Money Markets in Emerging Asia  |      26 
 
 
market activity of corporations usually reflects the ebbs and flows of their cash 
operations, rather than their longer-term structural funding requirements, which would be 
more aligned to the longer-term nature of their direct investments in plant, machinery, 
and working capital. The corporate sector can also play a role in market development as 
well as act in its own self interest. While it is common for corporations to have strong 
one-on-one relationships with their primary bank (or alternatively to limit their dealings to 
a small number of domestic banks), the corporate sector can also enhance development 
within a marketplace by expanding the panel of banks servicing their needs. This is 
especially true with foreign banks, which may import solutions and intensify competition 
and product innovation in less developed markets. 
 
4.1.4  Fund Managers and Investors 
 
In line with the need for diversification and in pursuit of increased returns, fund 
managers and investors have sought new international markets and the opportunities 
they present. Alongside international fund managers, locally based managers invest on 
behalf of pension funds and other pooled investment funds, representing a prime 
distribution channel for both shorter-dated money market instruments and longer-dated 
debt securities. Portfolio investors often have longer time horizons and a relatively high 
tolerance for the currency risk inherent in an internationally diversified portfolio. The risk 
associated with the holding of foreign currency-denominated securities may be factored 
in as just one component of the overall risk–return equation and allows this customer 
segment to effectively see currency exposure as a separate and diversifiable risk 
position within a broader portfolio.  
 
International investors and the funds management industry can add benefit and liquidity 
to markets focused primarily on their domestic investor base. As a natural distribution 
point for money market securities, fund managers have the ability to shape market 
development given the demand–driven model of market development. Demand for 
higher-yielding, asset-backed commercial paper or similar instruments will encourage 
banks to package assets for sale, while at the same time enhancing returns on an 
investor’s portfolio. Additionally, the willingness of this segment to hold securitized debt 
frees up bank balance sheets for additional lending and asset generation.  
 
As has been demonstrated, each of the four main operating segments within a money 
market has the ability to contribute to the future development of markets in emerging 
economies. At the same time, they provide improved efficiencies for themselves in the 




5.  The Potential Structural Shift and Crowding in Debt Capital 
Markets 
 
Government stimulus packages, which have been implemented in a number of countries 
since the onset of the global financial crisis, have resulted in an unprecedented 
requirement for the financing of government bond issuances. These requirements will  
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extend well into the future and are likely to have a significant impact on the availability of 
longer-dated fixed rate finance for the private sector. Effectively, the private sector will 
have to compete against the government sector for bond financing from the same base 
of investors. The supply concerns have been reflected in sharply rising yields for longer-
dated bonds despite ongoing concerns about the deflationary effects of global 
deleveraging. Instead of yields falling to reflect deflationary fears, the supply concern 
has seen US Treasury 10-year yields rise from 2.05% in December 2008 to 3.51% by 
the end of June 2009. US Treasury bond issues are expected to reach USD3.25 trillion 
in the year to September, up by USD1.95 trillion over the same period in the previous 
year. The Congressional Budget Office estimates an additional USD10.0 trillion of debt 
will be added by 2019.
12 
 
While the current concern focuses on the ability of the market to fund increased 
government debt, a separate issue arises out of the possibility that the private sector is 
being crowded out of debt capital markets. Any reversion of funding models could have 
implications for the future functioning and design of global money markets, in addition to 
the expansion of risk premiums for short- and longer-dated advances. 
 
In looking at international capital markets, the most rapid developments began in the late 
1980s as financial disintermediation and the development of global capital markets 
accelerated. This had profound effects as well-rated corporate borrowers, who had 
previously sought funding through single bank or syndicated loan facilities directly from 
their relationship banks, now had access to securitized debt markets as an alternate 
funding source. The major corporate borrowers found themselves able to access a deep 
pool of international investors. Additionally, the development of derivative products 
further attracted a wider pool of both issuers and investors as the swap market allowed 
the currency denomination—or duration of underlying cash flows of issuances—to be 
aligned with the participants preferred profile in major currencies. 
 
The disintermediation process fundamentally changed the relationship between the 
lending banks and their corporate borrowers. Investment banks acting as underwriters 
and arrangers provided another avenue of funding through the sale of securities through 
their well-developed distribution channels to an end investor customer base. Outside of 
the international marketplace, a similar process occurred in which originate-to-distribute 
models competed with bank lending for domestic borrowers in developed onshore 
domestic markets. 
 
Traditional balance sheet lending had been considerably reduced by global issuances, 
which in turn had been priced at considerably narrower margins than the loans they 
replaced. Naturally, the corporate sector became more focused on this method of 
finance. Exposure to debt capital markets also increased, while excess liquidity 
compressed margins on loans with commercial banks as competition increased from 
securitization programs, domestic debt markets, and other banks. Well-rated large 
corporate borrowers were able to compete with government and quasi-government 
issuers for term funding provided at margins much less than available from commercial 
loans. In an environment of excess liquidity and easy credit, both government and 
                                                 
12  Business Spectator. May 2009. The Price of Panic. The Financial Crisis and Money Markets in Emerging Asia  |      28 
 
 
corporate sectors could be comfortably accommodated from the same pool of 
international investors. 
 
With the global financial crisis that ensued in 2008, deficit funding requirements changed 
the appetite of international investors.  In 2009, an increase in issuance has 
accompanied an easing in credit conditions as confidence has edged back up from the 
low levels of late 2008. International debt markets, however, remain largely dominated 
by issues backed by sovereign guarantees, which may flood the more cautious investor 
base at considerably higher real rates of return than were available before the crisis. 
Private access to international investors could be limited as many non-government 
guaranteed borrowers return to traditional lending from their bankers and syndicate 
members. Additionally, the risk appetite in many major banks for international syndicated 
lending opportunities may become more limited as the increasing predominance of 
government shareholders may cause scarce capital and resources to be devoted to 
domestic financing in order to aid domestic recovery.
13 
 
An increase in on balance sheet lending is also likely to have implications for the money 
market operations of participating banks. For example, short-term money market 
advances are not a viable option for major private sector funding requirements. This is 
because committed formal lending facilities from banks will be required that tend to lack 
the flexibility and pricing power of debt capital markets. Prior to the crisis, many 
corporate floating rate facilities were priced more in line with the floating rate premium 
for the underlying credit exposure—with little premium attached for the liquidity risk. As a 
result of the liquidity crisis, banks are increasingly likely to require an appropriate return 
for the liquidity risk in addition to the risk premium built into the credit margin. The 
potential crowding out of the corporate sector from major debt capital markets may also 
have implications for money markets as borrowers increasingly look for facilities from 
their bankers. An increase in syndicated on balance sheet borrowing by the private 
sector will need to be funded largely by the wholesale money markets. This will generate 
both balance sheet and capital pressures. While the growth in lending opportunities will 
be welcomed by banks, their funding sources will need to be expanded and structured to 







                                                 
13  According to the World Bank’s Global Development Finance, in 2008 total capital flows to developing 
countries fell from USD1.2 trillion to USD707 billion. This number is expected to fall to USD363 billion 
in 2009. Between 2002 and 2007, 3,000 corporations in developing countries borrowed money in the 
international syndicated bank debt market and 700 issued international bonds. Much of the USD2.3 
trillion of debt raised in this period is now maturing. Together with increasing loan costs for new debt, 
the heavy rollover schedule will place strains on both liquidity and debt servicing capability, particularly 
in countries where the domestic currency has depreciated against the debt issuance currency. All of 
this is occurring against a backdrop of sharply reduced export demand. In addition, the external 
financing task will be made more difficult by the reduction of private capital flows. While inflows 
assisted by multilateral organizations will help, as will the tapping of available foreign reserves, the task 
remains daunting.  
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Table 3: Local Currency (LCY)-Denominated Bond Issuance (Gross) 
 
  Growth rate 
(LCY base %)    Growth rate 
(USD base %) 
  1Q2009  1Q2009 
  y-o-y  y-o-y 
China, People's Rep. of 
Total (54.2)    (53.0) 
Government (68.4)    (67.6) 
Corporate  143.3     149.7  
Hong Kong, China 
Total  93.1     93.9  
Government  89.6     90.4  
Corporate  145.5     146.5  
Indonesia 
Total (46.3)    (57.7) 
Government (46.1)    (57.6) 
Corporate (66.9)    (74.0) 
Korea, Rep. of 
Total  38.4     0.3  
Government 27.2      (7.8) 
Corporate  94.9     41.3  
Malaysia 
Total (15.5)    (25.9) 
Government (5.1)    (16.9) 
Corporate (45.6)    (52.3) 
Philippines 
Total  99.2     71.6  
Government  92.4     65.8  
Corporate  190.9     150.6  
 
Singapore 
Total  11.2     0.8  
Government  20.0     8.8  
Corporate (64.8)    (68.1) 
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  Growth rate 
(LCY base %)    Growth rate 
(USD base %) 
  1Q2009  1Q2009 
  y-o-y  y-o-y 
Thailand 
Total  36.7     21.1  
Government  48.0     31.0  
Corporate (35.8)    (43.2) 
Viet Nam 
Total (93.6)    (94.2) 
Government (93.6)    (94.2) 
Corporate  0.0     0.0  
Total Emerging East Asia 
Total (20.3)    (26.2) 
Government (28.9)    (34.0) 
Corporate  71.8     55.1  
 
Less PRC 
Total 17.7      (1.6) 
Government 17.4      (1.8) 
Corporate 20.2      (0.1) 
Japan 
Total (3.1)    (2.7) 
Government (3.7)    (3.2) 
Corporate  2.0     2.6  
 
N o t e s :         
1 Corporate bonds include issues by  financial  institutions.       
2 Bloomberg LP end-of-period LCY–USD rates are used.             
3 For LCY-base, total emerging East Asia growth figures are based on end-March 2009 currency exchange rates 
and do not include currency effects. 
S o u r c e :         
People's Republic of China (http://www.chinabond.com.cn); Hong Kong, China (Hong Kong Monetary Authority); 
Indonesia (Bloomberg LP); Republic of Korea (Bank of Korea); Malaysia (Bloomberg LP); Philippines (Bloomberg 
LP); Singapore (Bloomberg LP); Thailand (Bank of Thailand); Viet Nam (Bloomberg LP); and Japan (Japan 






Table 3 continued 
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Box 2:   Aspects of External Financing for Emerging Markets 
 
Given the liquidity shortages of the third quarter of 2008, even countries with relatively 
sound systems and liquidity experienced significant decreases in cross-border banking 
flows. Included in this group were both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Malaysia, 
whose banking systems could have been considered quite liquid. Following the Lehman 
Brothers collapse, the problem spread and intensified with reversals in portfolio flows, local 
currency (LCY) depreciation and rising bond yields. With the fourth quarter market 
meltdown, cross-border banking flows decreased dramatically.  
 
A recent report  looked at some of the factors that affected the flow decreases and also at 
possible mitigating factors to explain the uneven results. It was found that the presence and 
size of a foreign bank sector in a particular country did initially affect the flow of cross-
border funding. Using the example of smaller central and eastern European countries with a 
largely foreign-owned banking system, the early evidence shows that parent bank support 
for their local subsidiaries may explain the more stable behavior of the cross-border flows.  
 
Trade finance contracted more sharply than could be explained solely by lower volumes 
and prices. Reduced credit lines from banks and reduced secondary market support for 
trade instruments were reflected in the sharp reduction in the provision of finance.  
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) into the region initially held up better than expected at the 
onset of the crisis. However, there is evidence of lower FDI flows in early 2009. One 
explanation for the decline is related to a reduction in mergers and acquisitions, which are 
typically financed by international banks. Reductions were also recorded for syndicated 
loans, while there were increased remittances to multinational parent companies in 
developed countries and a reduction of intra-company loans to regional subsidiaries. 
 
In considering factors that supported economic activity in the face of declining exports and 
capital flow reversals, two significant issues emerge. The first is that throughout the crisis 
central banks depleted their foreign reserves by providing foreign currency to enable the 
private sector to repay loans and intervening in foreign exchange (FX) markets to stabilize 
currencies. In the case of India and the Republic of Korea (Korea), foreign reserves 
declined to 80% of their June 2008 levels during the first quarter of 2009.  
 
The second issue relates to the resilience of the banking system against a backdrop of 
decreasing access to cross-border funding. The reduction of external financing will need to 
be replaced by domestic lending. However, the ability of local banks to support increased 
demand for external funding may be difficult due to their limited access to external markets. 
A loan-to-deposit ratio of more than one indicates reliance on access to external finance 
such as was recently the case in Korea. Evidence from the first quarter of 2009 shows that 
domestic banks have been able to support domestic credit growth, albeit at reduced levels. 
 
Factors that have contributed to the ability of domestic banking systems to absorb 
increased domestic demand for credit include a considerable improvement in banking 
system resilience due to increased profitability, greatly increased regulatory capital 
requirements, and a reduction in nonperforming loans over the early part of the decade. 
These structural improvements come on top of support from authorities provided during the 
current crisis, including additional liquidity, lower policy rates and reserve requirements, 
deposit guarantees, and bilateral currency swaps. 
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6.  Imperfections and Various Paths for the Region’s Money 
Market Development 
 
International money markets in Singapore and Hong Kong, China stand out as the 
region’s most efficient and liquid markets. Markets in Singapore and Hong Kong, China 
enjoy the broad based participation of both domestic and foreign banks, offering depth 
and liquidity as well as a developed investor segment. These markets also have efficient 
distribution channels between the main interbank markets and end users. They are 
highly integrated into global financial markets and trade a wide range of instruments 
denominated in domestic and foreign currencies. A common foundation of both markets 
is a strong and transparent legal and regulatory framework. They both have proactive 
monetary authorities—the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) and the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore (MAS)—that oversee regulations and operations in the open 
market. Government support through policy initiatives has also encouraged development 
and growth in the banking industry. Low tax regimes, the ability to import human capital, 
and a willingness to integrate their markets into the global financial sector contributed to 
both centers becoming regional banking hubs. While these two international financial 
centers stand out as being extremely open and competitive with global money markets, 
theirs is not the only path to market efficiency. 
 
In Malaysia, the focus has been on developing domestic money markets, which has led 
to robust markets in MYR-denominated cash and securities. Malaysian money markets 
have developed considerable depth and breadth since the 1990s. For example, the 
emphasis on developing domestic currency trading and securities helped insulate the 
economy from the worst effects of the recent financial crisis—approximately 90% of 
bank assets are held in MYR-denominated assets. Other characteristics of Malaysian 
money markets include Islamic finance the development of a liquid bond market 
populated by both domestic issuers and investors; reduced regulatory restrictions; the 
establishment of an offshore banking center in Labuan; and the recently released 
Financial Sector Master Plan, which is expected to encourage greater incumbent foreign 
bank participation as well as the entry of new foreign banks. Malaysia’s financial markets 
are expected to be strengthened by these initiatives and the Malaysian development 
path could come to be viewed as an example for other emerging markets seeking to 




Box 3:   Islamic Finance—The New Silk Road? 
 
Islamic Finance has been growing rapidly in recent years and is now estimated to account for 
over USD700 billion in transactions worldwide.
14  Although concentrated in Malaysia and the 
Middle East, Islamic Finance represents an opportunity for the expansion of Asian money 
markets.  
 
                                                 
14  IFSL Research in partnership with UK Trade & Investment. 2009. Islamic Finance.  
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Islamic banking continues to grow at 10%–15% annually with total outstanding assets valued 
at USD622 billion in 2007. Sukuk
15 (Islamic bonds) have also shown rapid growth with 
issuance in 2007 estimated at over USD100 billion, with a doubling in growth each year since 
2004. The global takaful (insurance) industry is growing at 20% annually with premiums 
estimated at USD7.2 billion in 2007 and over USD200 billion under management (Figure B1). 
 
Islamic finance is structured to avoid riba (interest), maisir (gambling), and gharar 
(ambiguity)—which are all prohibited under shari’a. Transactions are limited to ethical 
investments and usually involve the financing institution buying the underlying asset and either 
leasing it or selling it back to the borrower on a profit-sharing basis. Financial transactions 
should also be supported by an economic activity in business or trade to ensure that funds are 
channeled into a productive activity, which shields the Islamic financial system from excessive 
leveraging, imprudent risk-taking, and speculative activities.
16  
 
For countries that have developed shari’a-compliant financial products, the opportunity 
presents itself to establish smaller specialist markets. Malaysia is at the forefront of Islamic 
finance. It remains the main issuer of global sukuk, with total issuance of USD26 billion, or 
more than 60% of the world's sukuk issues in 2007,
17 and is the largest issuer of Islamic 
products in Asia. In 2008, sukuk in Malaysia accounted for 38%
18 of total local currency (LCY) 
bonds outstanding, with the quantity of outstanding Islamic (shari’a-compliant) money market 
paper about as large as that of conventional (interest-bearing) short-term securities.
19   
 
In February 2009, Indonesia issued the equivalent of USD466 million in IDR-denominated 
sukuk to the retail market and announced plans to issue additional USD-denominated sukuk in 
the near future. Thailand initially introduced Islamic banking and savings to service the 




Brunei Darussalam has an Islamic Banking Act and has issued shari’a-compliant financial 
instruments since 2006. The country is well placed to capitalize on the growth of this banking 
medium to coincide with development of its International Finance Center. While it has to 
compete as a conventional banking provider within the same time zone as Singapore and 
Hong Kong, China; Brunei Darussalam has the potential to enjoy a comparative advantage as 
a provider of Islamic banking services. The Philippines has established a government-
controlled Islamic bank—Al Amanah Islamic Investment Bank (AAIIB)—following the central 
bank’s provision of regulations for Islamic banking in 1996. In addition, the money centers of 
both Singapore and Hong Kong, China have greatly expanded their Islamic banking 
operations in a bid to attract their share of this growth opportunity.
21   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
15  Sukuk are defined as certificates representing a proportional undivided ownership right in tangible 
assets, a pool of tangible assets, or a business venture in a specific project or investment activity in 
accordance with shari'a principles. 
16  Dr. Zeti Akhtar Aziz, 2009. Address by the Governor of Bank Negara Malaysia at the Euromoney 
Islamic Finance Summit. 24 February 2009. 
17  IFSL Research in partnership with UK Trade & Investment. 2009. Islamic Finance. 
18 ADB.  AsiaBondsOnline  website http://asianbondsonline.adb.org 
19  Loreton and Wooldridge. 2008. The Development of Money Markets in Asia. BIS Quarterly Review. 
September 2008. 
20 ADB.  AsiaBondsOnline  website http://asianbondsonline.adb.org 
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Source: Islamic Finance, IFSL Research 2009. 
 
 
In developing country money markets, one area of focus could be trade-finance-related 
securities. The extension of trade finance credit has been significantly boosted by a G20 
commitment to provide USD250 billion over the next 2 years to support trade finance 
globally. This commitment follows various national efforts through export–import banks 
and similar agencies. ADB recently announced a Trade Finance Facilitation Program, 
which is one of many regional initiatives targeting increased flows of trade financing. The 
program will help banks in developing countries provide trade-related finance through a 
credit guarantee product that will confirm banks against payment by trade credits issued 
by approved banks. The program also includes a revolving credit facility in which ADB 
provides loans to issuing banks to on-lend to exporters and importers to finance their 
trade-related transactions. Depending upon whether the trade transaction is securitized 
in the form of trade bills, as opposed to straight loans, this facility could represent an 
opportunity for less developed money markets to specialize in credit-enhanced paper 
trading as well as with counterparties that have a credit enhancement on their trade 
transaction by virtue of a guarantee from a third party.  
 
Elsewhere in the region, domestic money market development varies. However, there 
are a number of market structure issues that inhibit market advancement or interfere 
with the effectiveness of capital allocation. In Indonesia, for example, smaller banks with  
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limited capital bases, including rural banks, are at a disadvantage in competing 
effectively with their larger and better capitalized counterparts. The central bank—Bank 
Indonesia—also made exchange rate stability its strategic priority following the currency 
depreciation due to capital flight during the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. Accordingly, 
monetary policy has targeted exchange rate stability aimed at avoiding disinvestment 
through rates that are kept relatively high. As a capital-importing economy with a 
significant dependence on commodity investment, exchange rate stability is critical for 
Indonesia and options for substantial interest rate easing are somewhat limited. 
 
In order for financial markets to develop further, banking sector restructuring could assist 
in the recapitalization of banks and allow them to grow sufficiently and to compete with 
other larger banks in the region. However, in some economies, blockages in the 
transmission mechanism of rate reductions provide one example of markets not 
functioning at optimal levels. Rates in wholesale money markets may for example have 
reflected policy changes, but the underlying real economy may not have felt the full 
benefits as rate reductions by major banks are not being passed on to the customer 
base. A further opening up of financial markets via less restrictions on foreign ownership 
of local banks and the issuance of more licenses—both of which are currently under 
consideration by for example Thailand’s Ministry of Finance—could assist in promoting 
competition in domestic money markets while also unblocking the transmission 
mechanism. 
 
The funding gap and open arbitrage opportunity for funding local assets with short-dated 
foreign currency borrowings—as was the case in Korea, stoking both volatility in asset 
markets and occasionally generating price movements counter to official monetary policy 




The existence of “kerb”, or unofficial, markets reflects the misallocation of resources in 
the official marketplace. In the PRC, for example, kerb markets operate alongside the 
official markets and extend beyond securities trading to include money markets. As a 
result, there is an informal lending market for companies with surplus liquidity to provide 
funds for companies in need.  
 
Of the recent growth in lending in the PRC, however, it is estimated that a large portion 
of it is being soaked up by state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
23 Of CNY1.62 trillion in new 
loans made in January 2009, an estimated 90% flowed to SOE projects. The heavy bias 
                                                 
22  The heavy forward selling of US dollars by Korean exporters allowed an arbitrage opportunity to 
appear, in which dollars could be swapped in the offshore forward and swap markets into won at levels 
up to 100 basis points beneath onshore certificates of deposit (CDs) and government bonds. While 
authorities acted to limit short-dated dollar debt by imposing limits on foreign currency lending to 
domestic borrowers—and put a withholding tax in place—arbitrage players purchased substantial 
amounts of paper funded by the cheaper offshore forward market. The subsequent disruption in dollar 
liquidity saw the trades unwind with pressure exerted on both the won-funding markets as well as the 
securities markets, which saw high levels of volatility as assets were sold to unwind trades. Similar in 
effect to the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, this disruption was caused by large capital outflows that 
derived from short-dated interbank loans. The arbitrage opportunity, despite authorities’ efforts, had 
become massive, and its unwinding over a short timeframe exacerbated a volatile situation. 
23  Financial Review. September 2009. China’s SOEs do most of the Reaping. The Financial Crisis and Money Markets in Emerging Asia  |      36 
 
 
of the PRC’s stimulus plan towards SOEs is effectively crowding out private sector 
borrowers. It is also estimated that about 70% of loans from the PRC’s four major state-
owned commercial banks were made to SOEs that account for only one third of the 
country’s total production.
24 The perceived reluctance of banks in the PRC to lend funds 
to non-state enterprises has led to creditworthy corporations being forced to use 
unofficial markets to generate funding at rates well above spreads in the official markets. 
This represents a misallocation of resources away from an efficient user toward a more 
familiar, but less efficient, user of the same capital. This situation is in part due to the 
limited credit analysis capacity among the relevant lending divisions of banks with regard 
to small and private corporations. 
 
Confidence, market depth, and liquidity are key to ensuring the efficient allocation of 
capital throughout the system. While each market has domestic considerations for 
fashioning its money market development, the central tenets common to all markets 
include the requirement for confidence, market depth, and liquidity. In looking at ways to 
generate both confidence and liquidity, it is helpful to understand the interrelationship 
between the two. It is very difficult to imagine a deep and liquid market that lacks the 
confidence of the financial community. It is also difficult to imagine a market that has the 
financial community’s confidence yet is lacking depth and liquidity—particularly given the 
competitive nature of global financial markets and the pursuit of returns. The task of 
generating such conditions is made more difficult by the fact that confidence is an 
intangible that has no physical structure to be broken down and analyzed to understand 
how it is created. However, the essential elements of both confidence and liquidity are 
clearly evident when looking at any efficient market, whether financial or otherwise.  
 
To ensure the existence of an efficient market that can function at its optimal level in 
allocating resources, market liquidity must capture the aspects of immediacy, breadth, 
depth, and resiliency. Immediacy refers to the speed with which a trade of a given size 
and cost can be completed; breadth, often measured by the bid–ask spread, refers to 
the costs of providing liquidity; depth refers to the maximum size of a trade for any given 
bid–ask spread; and resiliency refers to how quickly prices revert to fundamental values 
after a large transaction. In looking at financial markets in developing economies and the 
measures required to engender confidence and enhance liquidity, the underlying needs 
of a particular market must be given special consideration. Financial markets must be 
developed within the constraints of real demand from end users rather than just 
intermediaries. 
 
A market’s depth is a quantitative measure that refers to the ability of a market to handle 
large trade volumes without a significant impact on prices.
25 From a money market 
perspective, the spot FX market for the major currencies is an example of a market that 
is very liquid and capable of absorbing large and unexpected flows.  
 
An alternate aspect of a market’s breadth can be considered from two different 
qualitative aspects. The first is the spread of competing interests in a market where there 
                                                 
24  The four largest state-owned commercial banks in the PRC are ICBC, Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank, and the Agricultural Bank of China. 
25  OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms.  
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is a large pool of interested participants, although they are not necessarily coming from 
the same transactional direction. For example, market breadth is enhanced by the 
participation of a range of parties—market makers and intermediaries, originators and 
sellers, investors, end users, and buyers—that interact through price discovery to 
balance out demand and supply. Another aspect of breadth is related to the range of 
alternative competing products to satisfy customer demand. This allows the buyer to find 
the most efficient solution from the range of competing products. From a money market 
perspective, alternatives in investment products could be the differing returns available 
from deposits when compared with purchasing either commercial paper, bank 
certificates of deposit (CDs), or treasury bills—all of which will provide a return on funds 
invested, but with each one having its own unique characteristics.  
 
Local money markets often have insufficient depth and liquidity to attract global portfolio 
investors. Market liquidity under a range of measures has generally failed to grow in line 
with either the development of LCY bond markets or that of more developed bond 
markets.
26 Studies have suggested the following: 
 
(i)  Turnover ratios measuring secondary market trading relative to bonds on issue in 
emerging East Asia failed to increase in line with other markets. This is partly attributable 
to the rise of buy-to-hold fund managers who sought LCY assets in order to match their 
liabilities. This market segment rarely traded the stock back to the secondary market and 
thereby contributed to reduced liquidity (Figures 2a and 2b). 
 
(ii)  Bid–ask spreads as a measure of market tightness indicate that spreads are 
stable but remain relatively wide when compared to more developed markets. Also, 
spreads widen when comparing government with corporate issuance, hampering 
turnover as the cost of trading remains relatively high.  
 
(iii)  Yield volatility is also elevated in developing markets due, in part, to the 
involvement of speculative investors with aggressive trading strategies. This feature can 




27 on measures to develop more sophisticated financial products and the 
diversification of risk exposures—in addition to liquidity and efficiency—in emerging 
Asian bond markets have identified clear guidelines on foreign investment, regulatory 
quality and creditor rights, market infrastructure, taxation, and the size of the local 
institutional investor base. Rules and regulations should also be clear, transparent, 
consistent, and simple. A rational conclusion that could be drawn from these studies 
would be that liquidity and wider investor participation in money markets can be 




                                                 
26  ADB. November 2008. Asia Bond Monitor. Manila. 
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7.  Challenges in Bringing Money Markets Back to Life 
 
Despite the diversity that exists in emerging Asian markets, there is a common financial 
market architecture that can enhance the development of individual markets in the 
region.  A transparent and robust legal and regulatory framework  is a fundamental 
precondition for maintaining confidence in financial markets as participants look for 
certainty and the enforceability of legal obligations. A regulatory environment is 
enhanced by consistency in application to each market segment, which provides the 
banking system with a clear roadmap of regulatory expectations and requirements. 
Prudent regulation and policy aimed at the appropriate level of bank capitalization in the 
marketplace is particularly important in a market that includes a large number of smaller 
financial institutions, which may be encouraged to consolidate to achieve sufficient size 
in both capitalization and balance sheets. 
 
Credible central bank policies and market activity supportive of policy objectives are 
essential for market confidence. Information flows and the flexibility of open market 
operations are important to increase confidence in the central bank’s willingness and 
ability to ensure the smooth functioning of the system. Liquidity injections and 
broadening acceptable securities for repos is a recent example of central bank policy 
flexibility. The actions of the US Federal Reserve in relation to the seizing-up of secured 
lending markets and their initial response to broaden access could provide regional 
central banks with an example of future contingency planning in extreme circumstances.  
 
The continued liberalization of domestic financial markets and the encouragement of 
foreign bank and skilled labor to participate in local markets will create deep and 
functioning markets able to respond to the underlying financial needs of the economy. 
These actions also promote a market’s ability to efficiently allocate financial resources. 
In addition, foreign bank competition within the domestic market tends to enhance 
efficiency as technology and international practices are imported and find their way into 
domestic institutions and the local marketplace. A market looking to develop its financial 
system may import expertise more quickly rather than cultivate it domestically, thereby 
shortening the ramp-up period toward full development. A competitive taxation regime 
can also help drive regional competition for financial institutions to domicile themselves 
in one country over another. 
 
Effective risk management processes—applied at both the regulatory levels and by 
individual participants—are important to instill confidence in other market participants 
and the risk profile of the market itself. A risk management system that recognizes 
imbalances in a financial system and provides early warnings that instigate policy 
responses can assist in building confidence. Cross-border collaboration with regional 
policymakers, regulators, and market participants will encourage mutual oversight and 
best practices. Improved corporate governance is also crucial for the management of 
financial institutions’ operations, for money market communication, and for boosting 
market confidence in financial institutions.  
 
Effective distribution channels to secondary markets can help offset securities and risk 
positions against an underlying real demand, and help reduce market risk of both parties 
and increase primary market operations. A robust deposit base and stable funding  
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platform that gives attention to loan-to-deposit ratios can also help banks avoid 
imbalances and risks associated with too much dependence on wholesale funding 
markets, and wider access to international capital markets can help increase competition 
in onshore markets and drive both volumes and price efficiencies toward end users.  
 
Liquidity in the region’s money markets can be deepened by proactive financial policies 
and practices that encourage participation by a broad and diversified investor base, 
which will contribute to the depth of financial markets. International banks can bring a 
different risk appetite as they break into new industry segments and develop a local 
customer base. Domestic institutions’ wider access to the financial marketplace can also 
add depth by encouraging domestic investment vehicles and pension fund managers to 
use a broader set of investment products rather than simple money market deposits and 
government bonds. In particular, encouraging niche players that specialize in market 
sectors or have a particular strength can drive competitive pricing and contribute to 
depth in the market. 
 
Product innovation such as securitization of receivables or mortgage pools can provide a 
broader product range for alternative investments and drive efficiencies toward end-
investors, who would be given a wider choice of competing products, as well as free-up 
the balance sheets of originating banks. Introducing derivatives and other hedging 
mechanisms can also help encourage liquidity and depth, while providing a mechanism 
to offset risk without liquidating underlying positions.  
 
Effective market infrastructure and support systems, such as trading and settlement 
systems, can better handle increased turnover and volumes, which will be required as 
markets grow and become more liquid. Such systems can also help facilitate information 
flows and technological advances, particularly for trading platforms that assist trading 
throughput; thereby increasing liquidity, putting downward pressure on volatility, and 
making risk management simpler. Enhanced credit, settlement, and market risk 
management systems can also increase confidence at the individual bank level—by 
ensuring that risks are within the limits of internal tolerance—and allow banks to make 
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Figure 7a: Government Bond Turnover Ratios 














1. Calculated as LCY trading volume (sales amount only) divided by average LCY value of outstanding 
bonds during each 3-month period. 
2.  Bonds outstanding for India as of 4Q2008. 
Source:  
People’s Republic of China (http://www.chinabond.com.cn); Hong Kong, China (Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority); Indonesia (Indonesia Stock Exchange); Korea (KoreaBondWeb and Bank of Korea); Malaysia 
(Bank Negara Malaysia); Philippines (Bureau of the Treasury); Singapore (Monetary Authority of 
Singapore and Singapore Government Securities); Thailand (Thai Bond Market Association and Bank of 
Thailand); Japan (Japan Securities Dealers Association); and India (Clearing Corporation of India Ltd. 
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Figure 7b: Corporate Bond Turnover Ratios 












1.  Calculated as LCY trading volume (sales amount only) divided by the average LCY value of 
outstanding bonds during each 3-month period.  
2.  Bonds outstanding for India as of 4Q2008. 
Source:  
People’s Republic of China (http://www.chinabond.com.cn); Hong Kong, China (Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority); Indonesia (Indonesia Stock Exchange); Republic of Korea (KoreaBondWeb and Bank of 
Korea); Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia); Philippines (Bureau of the Treasury); Singapore (Monetary 
Authority of Singapore and Singapore Government Securities); Thailand (Thai Bond Market 
Association and Bank of Thailand); Japan (Japan Securities Dealers Association); and India (Reserve 
Bank of India and the Clearing Corporation of India Ltd.). 
 
 
7.1  The Funding Model 
 
The funding model used by market participants and end users in the real economy is at 
the core of most imbalances within financial systems. It is often related to mismatching 
maturities, interest rates, or currency exposures. The funding model used by market 
participants and end users in the real economy is usually related to one or more aspects 
of mismatching maturities (liquidity), interest rates, or currency exposures. The causes 
may be an excess dependence on foreign currency borrowings, short-dated money 
market loans supporting longer-dated assets, or an overreliance on one funding source. 
In a properly functioning and liquid interbank money market, the funding decision will be 
price sensitive, whereby the cost or return will largely be the sole determinant of whether 
to fund in local or foreign currency.
28 This is particularly apt in interbank money markets, 
where considerations of mismatching maturities within internal tolerances is an integral 
part of book management, and also where liquidity issues are less significant given the 
short-dated nature of transactions and the bank status of participants. 
                                                 
28  Where a price differential exists and all else is equal, arbitrage traders will quickly eliminate any 
significant differential by borrowing in one market and swapping the currency and lending or investing 
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A differential may result from intentional regulations limiting market activity or from 
external factors that inhibit market efficiency. Examples of these include (i) limited 
access to LCY for foreign banks, based on regulations and the effective existence of a 
two-tier, onshore and offshore market; (ii) central bank rules that determine acceptable 
purposes for LCY transactions, such as trade-based dealings; (iii) a lack of liquidity in 
one currency and or thin market participation; (iv) restricted access to foreign currency; 
and (v) insufficient dealing, credit, or settlement lines between participants.  
 
The creation of a currency exposure is as complicated as it is important for both end 
users of the funds and the small investors who have limited portfolio diversification. 
Where an efficient, open, and liquid short-dated market operates, the currency funding 
decision for interbank trading is a straightforward price consideration and is usually free 
from other factors. This is not necessarily the case outside interbank markets, where the 
situation can be quite different, particularly for corporate participants in the real 
economy. In contrast to the interbank borrower, a manufacturer will require funding to 
build and operate a plant, fund inventory, and provide working capital. In this situation, 
considerations are quite different from those of the short-term money market and its 
interbank users.  
 
Factors to consider include (i) which currency offers the longer duration and best fits with 
the end needs of matching the duration of financial liabilities against financial or physical 
assets; (ii) the ability of the non-bank or commercial borrower to access foreign currency 
funding efficiently; (iii) whether the credit quality of the borrower is sufficient to access 
capital markets directly through bond issuance, or if the borrower is limited to bank 
loans; (iv) depending on the currency of assets and cash flows, whether borrowing in 
another currency is an option, which could open foreign exchange exposures beyond 
what can be efficiently hedged; and (v) how to minimize interest rate exposure by 
determining which currency can provide longer-dated fixed rates rather than floating rate 
exposure.  
 
The real economy borrower will need to look at pricing as only one component of the 
decision-making process. This will ensure that funding is appropriate to needs and 
financial risk is mitigated by transferring it to the lender or investor. For example, 
corporate funding through longer-dated, fixed-rate bond issuance in the currency of its 
cash flows will effectively be transferring the liquidity, interest rate, and currency risks to 
the buyer of the security for the duration of the bond—unlike a borrower of shorter-dated 
funds faced with multiple rollovers, each with a new interest rate setting. 
 
In a mirror image of borrowers in the real economy, investors are faced with a similar 
situation in exposing investments to currency movements. While a particular currency 
may offer higher rates of return than the local currency, there remains a similar risk to 
the kind experienced by the borrower in terms of currency volatility and its effect on 
absolute returns. While longer-dated portfolio investors may be able to incorporate this 
risk through a portfolio effect over a range of diversified exposures, the smaller investor 
will usually not have the benefit of diversification. The investor will expose expected 
returns to currency risks that may well overpower the benefit gained by the increased 
interest rate. 
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8.  Conclusions: Emerging Stronger from the Global Financial 
Turmoil 
 
The transmission and impact of the financial crisis to otherwise healthy banking systems 
has highlighted the importance of addressing regulatory shortcomings and structural 
flaws that exist in some markets. For a money market to function optimally in allocating 
financial resources, deep and liquid markets need to operate with the broad participation 
of financial interests and a range of competing products and solutions. While the current 
crisis in the global banking system may tend to slow down market liberalization, a 
restricted market that does not encourage further development and competition is 
unlikely to function efficiently. The underlying rationale remains the same: consolidation 
of smaller banks, industry restructuring, and recapitalization may be necessary to 
strengthen the banking system and allow access to competing international markets. 
The benefits of more open and liberalized markets will be reflected in competitive pricing 
and access to financial solutions for users who generate underlying economic activity 
and drive growth. 
 
Improved liquidity management practices are central to ensuring that banks are aware of 
their structural liquidity position, measurement and modelling assumptions, and available 
buffers in the event of external shocks. It is recognized that liquidity buffers are relatively 
expensive to maintain at elevated levels. However, the cost of holding short-dated cash 
and government paper as protection against unforeseen circumstances should be 
considered against the even more expensive alternatives. While it is not possible to 
predict every contingency, it is clear that widely used risk management models and their 
implicit assumptions were deficient in dealing with the global financial crisis. In the 
future, such models will need to be broadened and upgraded to consider a broader 
universe of potential circumstances. Liquidity models have largely been based on long 
held assumptions about the historical performance and prior market acceptance of 
various asset classes. An example of an unexpected impact of market stress can be 
found in asset-backed securities, which had previously been considered liquid through 
either sale or use as collateral for secured borrowing, were found to be almost 
completely illiquid in the early stages of the financial meltdown. 
 
The logistics of providing the skill sets required for both regulators and market 
participants in sufficient numbers will undoubtedly prove to be costly and challenging, 
particularly as the call for skilled supervisors and risk management practitioners rises 
with increased demand. However, the current financial crisis has demonstrated that 
these changes are both necessary and inevitable to ensure the efficient and stable 
functioning of financial markets in the future. 
 
Specific policy goals should include actions to ensure that adequate consideration has 
been given to assumptions built into models. These models should allow for exogenous 
and domestic shocks as well as the following: 
 
•  Reassess assumptions about market liquidity conditions and the stability of 
secured funding that underlie existing risk management practices. The 
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pricing and could be rolled over indefinitely was at the core of many funding models 
and structures. This assumption proved to be incorrect in the face of multiple external 
demand shocks. Future liquidity assumptions should consider worst case scenarios 
and, where appropriate, have alternatives available as committed facilities to 
determine the adequate size of liquidity buffers. Liquidity models should also take into 
account differentials between securities types beyond maturity patterns when looking 
at liquidity availability, particularly between government and commercial securities. 
Stress testing for various levels of rated securities can help assess the stability of 
secured funding and determine the risk of market liquidity for underlying collateral 
becoming questionable. In developing such models, securities acceptable for repos 
could be included at full market value and variously rated commercial paper could be 
given a discounted valuation for collateralization purposes. 
 
•  Consider extending temporary guarantees on a broad set of bank liabilities with 
the aim of reviving trade in money markets. The extensive use of deposit 
insurance schemes and guarantees proved successful in protecting bank deposits 
from panic and maintaining confidence between covered institutions and deposit 
types. Similarly, a guarantee covering wholesale international liabilities and debt 
issuance has allowed some global issuers to re-enter capital markets as 2009 
unfolded and markets slowly thawed. 
 
• Strengthen governance and risk management models. Regulation and 
supervisory guidance should be strengthened for money market participants with 
increased and more frequent supervision at the individual bank level, especially with 
regard to liquidity assumptions.
29 
 
•  Strengthen financial market infrastructure and complement the supervisory 
efforts of regulators. Measures may include  the encouragement of  markets for 
secured financing as well as derivative markets to provide risk management tools and 
additional liquidity options. Central banks should encourage development of markets 











                                                 
29  Under the Basel II enhancements approved at the July 2009 meeting, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision is strengthening the treatment for certain securitizations in Pillar 1 (minimum capital 
requirements). The committee is introducing higher risk weights for re-securitization exposures (so-
called collateralized debt obligations [CDOs] of asset-back securities) to better reflect the risk inherent 
in these products, as well as raising the credit conversion factor for short-term liquidity facilities to off 
balance sheet conduits. The committee is also requiring that banks conduct more rigorous credit 
analyses of externally rated securitization exposures.  
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